Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Lawyer Blog

Under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, the workers’ comp insurance carrier is responsible for all reasonable and necessary medical treatment which is related to the work injury. In very rare circumstances, the cost of wage loss (“indemnity”) benefits and medical expenses can be allocated between more than one insurance carrier. Typically, this would be seen when the injured worker is disabled by more than a single injury, involving multiple insurance companies.

Hearing loss cases, however, are treated differently under the PA Workers’ Compensation Act. When someone losses their hearing due to excessive noise in the workplace, the Act specifically states that, “An employer shall be liable only for the hearing impairment caused by such employer.” (Section 306(c)(8)(iv)).

Recently, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania decided the matter of James McClure, Sr. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Cerro Fabricated Products). Here, the injured worker had a documented hearing loss of 18.12% in 1997, while employed by a different employer. He became employed by Cerro in 2000. No Claim Petition was filed until 2004, when he had a hearing loss of 24.69%. The prior employer was dismissed, since more than three years passed since the last date Mr. McClure was exposed to excessive noise in the employ of the previous employer (Some injuries have a “discovery rule,” where the “statute of limitations” can be extended, where the injured worker has no reason to know or suspect the injury; there is no such rule in hearing loss under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act).

As followers of our blog are aware, we filed a workers’ compensation case on behalf of a PA liquor store clerk who was the victim of an armed robbery (and suffered post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result). We were successful before the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ), and the matter is currently pending before the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB). Though we, of course, follow all PA court decisions in the workers’ comp area, we have a particular interest in those dealing with this issue.

Yesterday, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania issued a decision in the matter of PA Liquor Control Board v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Kochanowicz). In what can only be described as a staggeringly repulsive decision, the Court reversed both the WCJ and WCAB, who both found that the claimant in that case suffered PTSD as a result of an armed robbery, and that the armed robbery was an “abnormal working condition.” Both the injured worker’s treating doctor, and the Independent Medical Examiner (IME)[Who often is anything but “independent”], found that the injured worker suffered PTSD as a result of the armed robbery.

In its infinite wisdom, the Court found that armed robberies at liquor stores in Pennsylvania are common; perhaps, if we are understanding their logic correctly, an armed robbery at a liquor store these days is akin to taking out the trash. Just another part of a clerk’s daily routine.

Often, injured workers in Pennsylvania have their claims denied by the workers’ comp insurance carrier because their disability is said to be related to a “degenerative” condition, rather than a traumatic one. In fact, almost inevitably, if the word “degenerative” appears in the medical records, the workers’ compensation claim will be denied by the workers’ comp insurance company, forcing the injured worker to litigate his or her claim.

Yet, these degenerative conditions are ones that allowed the injured worker to do his or her job, frequently even without difficulty, until the work injury. The fact that the work injury makes the degenerative changes disabling is what truly matters. In that situation, the injured worker is entitled to PA workers’ compensation benefits.

Recently, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania confirmed this premise in Green v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (US Airways). The case began when Ms. Green was injured at work in 1993. A Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP) was issued, accepting the injury as a meniscal tear in the right knee. The description of injury was later amended to include left tibial plateau cartilage damage and lateral femoral condyle defect. Workers’ compensation benefits were suspended in 2003.

Under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, Section 440(a), “where a claimant succeeds in a litigated case reasonable counsel fees are awarded against the employer, as a cost, unless the employer meets its burden of establishing facts sufficient to prove a reasonable basis for the contest.” The Act, as you can see, clearly states that this is to be the rule, not the exception. The employer/insurance carrier has the burden to prove that there was a reasonable contest. One would read that language and believe unreasonable contest counsel fees are often awarded. One would be dead wrong.

The reason why unreasonable contest counsel fees are rarely found these days is reflected in a recent decision by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, Grady v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Lutz t/a Top of the Line Roofing). Here, a roofer suffered a T12 burst fracture resulting in paraplegia of both lower extremities and depression when he fell from a rooftop.

Ultimately, a Claim Petition was filed against the Employer and the Uninsured Employers’ Guaranty Fund (UEGF). Initially, the parties asked the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) to “bifurcate” the case, to decide whether the injured worker was actually an employee (as opposed to an independent contractor). This lets the parties get past a threshold issue, before litigating the remainder of a case.

Once workers’ compensation benefits are suspended in Pennsylvania, for example when an injured worker goes back some type of gainful employment, the general rule is that workers’ comp benefits can be reinstated by simply proving his or her earning power is again adversely affected by the injury, and that the new disability is related to the original injury. As a general rule, the injured worker need not demonstrate that there has been a change in his or her condition.

This gets a bit more complicated when there is another condition impacting the employability of an injured worker. For instance, take the matter of Upper Darby Township v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Nicastro), decided by the Commonwealth Court of PA. Here, the claimant injured his low back at work in 2002 dumping a can into the garbage truck. A Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable (TNCP) was issued, accepting a low back strain. The TNCP subsequently converted to a regular Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).

The claimant returned to his regular duties in March, 2004, and workers’ comp benefits were suspended. On June 8, 2004, claimant again injured his low back lifting a trash can. A Petition was filed, but before there could be a decision by a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ), the parties resolved the case by Stipulation. Specifically, in the Stipulation the parties agreed that claimant was disabled by the work injury from June 8, 2004 until October 7, 2004, that claimant was able to go back to his regular job as of October 7, 2004 and that claimant left the employ of the company in December, 2004, because of “injuries unrelated to his back.”

Under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, mental injuries caused by a psychic, or mental, incident, require an injured worker to prove that the psychic, or mental, onset was an “abnormal working condition.” We have discussed psychological injuries under PA workers’ comp previously. We call these types of cases “mental/mental” cases.

But, what about a mental, or emotional, onset that leads to a physical injury (what we call a “mental/physical” case)? Back in 1981, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided Krawchuk v. Philadelphia Electric Company, wherein the Court granted workers’ comp benefits to an employee who suffered a heart attack at home, after having a great deal of stress at work. This was followed, however, by the Court’s decision in Davis v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Swarthmore Borough) in 2000, finding that abnormal working conditions were required in a case with an emotional or mental onset. Finally, the Court clarified things in 2005 in the case of Pankyo v. Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (U.S. Airways) (Pankyo).

In the Pankyo case, the Court found that the holding in Davis was limited. Specifically, the Court noted, “given the facts in Davis, that case only stands for the proposition that where a claimant suffers a psychic injury with attendant physical symptoms, the claimant must meet the abnormal working relations test.” On the other hand, where the injury itself is physical (again, such as a heart attack), the “abnormal working conditions” requirement does not apply (even though the onset was a mental incident).

Under Section 312 of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, an injured worker must provide notice to his or her employer that he or she “received an injury, described in ordinary language, in the course of his employment on or about a specified time, at or near a place specified.” This notice, under Section 311, must be given within 120 days of the injury, or the claim may be precluded. In reality, giving notice to an employer may not be so simple.

Take, for example, the facts in Gentex Corp. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Morack), a decision recently rendered by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The injured worker toiled on an assembly line for many years, repetitively using her hands. Eventually, she began to have pain and swelling in her hands, and her fingers would become “stuck.”

Finally, on January 17, 2005, Ms. Morack told her boss that her hands were hurting so bad, she did not know what to do. The injured worker saw a doctor that same day and got a note keeping her out of work. According to the company policy, Ms. Morack called her employer every day for the first five days she was out, advising the employer each day that she could not work because of the swelling in her hands. She did not specifically tell the employer that the swelling was from her work duties, because she was not sure what caused the problem. A short-term disability application was made, indicating the condition was the result of “sickness” rather than “injury,” since, at that time, Ms. Morack believed her condition was related to pre-existing fibromyalgia, not her work duties.