Articles Posted in Case Law Update

We have discussed “Utilization Review” (UR) on this blog many times. This is the tool used by either party (usually the workers’ compensation insurance carrier) to determine whether any particular treatment is “reasonable and necessary.” To start the UR process, the insurance company must agree the treatment is related to the work injury.

The Courts have made clear that treatment need not cure a condition to be “reasonable and necessary,” stating that relieving the symptoms of an injured worker can be enough. The burden to prove treatment is not “reasonable and necessary” remains with the workers’ comp insurance carrier throughout the UR process.

Most often, we see UR in situations involving treatment which is “palliative” (relieving symptoms) rather than “curative.” This could be concerning chiropractic treatment, therapeutic modalities, medications or injections. An interesting facet, discussing massage therapy, was addressed recently by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania in Moran v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (McCarthy Flowers).

Often, a work injury in Pennsylvania is not a sudden occurrence – not a fall, or lifting an item, or a car accident, but instead it is “cumulative trauma,” an injury that takes place over time. Perhaps someone who does data entry or assembly work, doing repetitive motions with their hands, develops carpal tunnel syndrome or ulnar neuropathy. Maybe a construction worker, or factory worker, suffers low back problems from years of heavy lifting. Cumulative trauma injuries can take many forms. The workers’ compensation insurance carriers in PA routinely deny such claims, but, do not be misled, cumulative trauma injuries are every bit as real, and those who suffer them every bit as deserving of benefits, as any other work injury in Pennsylvania.

Which employer is responsible, and the timing of notice are two of the major issues in these cases, and both were present in A & J Builders, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Verdi), recently decided by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Logic might suggest the responsible employer is simply the last employer, since, with cumulative trauma, every day is a new injury, the date of injury is usually the last day worked. But, as we always see in PA workers’ comp, the easy explanation is not always the correct one.

The injured worker in Verdi was a carpenter. He worked for A & J Builders, Inc. from 2004 to 2007. During this time, he developed right knee pain. By the time he left A & J, the right knee caused him chronic pain. Regardless, he then worked three days in 2008 for another contractor before being laid off. In March, 2009, Claimant saw a new doctor and was diagnosed with “chronic repetitive work-related chondral wear in the patellofemoral joint on his right knee.” This was the first time the injured worker was actually told the problem was related to work. Notice of the work injury was not provided until a Claim Petition was filed in July, 2009 (well over the 120 day period within which notice of a work injury is typically required).

As loyal readers of our blog know, “retirement” is a popular tool being used by the workers’ compensation insurance carriers in Pennsylvania to attack the benefits of injured workers in PA. Indeed, the fact that an injured worker can take such an innocent act as applying for a pension, or Social Security Retirement benefits, and jeopardize their entire workers’ comp case, is a large reason why we encourage all injured workers in Pennsylvania to be represented by experienced workers’ comp attorneys, who, like the attorneys at Brilliant & Neiman LLC, are Certified as Specialists in the Practice of Workers’ Compensation Law.

Today, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania decided the case of Turner v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Pittsburgh), which dealt with this “retirement” issue. Here, the injured worker was a police officer who hurt her neck, left shoulder, back, right wrist, and right knee in a work-related car accident in 1994. The injured worker performed a modified duty job for the City of Pittsburgh until 2003, when the City stopped the modified duty program. At that time, Claimant applied for, and received, a disability pension from the City of Pittsburgh.

The workers’ compensation insurance carrier filed a Petition for Suspension, alleging that the application for this pension meant that the injured worker had voluntarily left the labor market, retired in other words, causing a shift of the burden of proof to the injured worker, to show that she was either disabled from all employment, or that she continued to look for work.

The 1996 amendments to the Pennsylvania Workers Compensation Act (Act 57) were largely a disaster for every worker in PA. Any thought that, as Pennsylvania’s appellate courts like to spout, the PA Workers’ Compensation Act is a piece of “remedial legislation” intended for “humanitarian purposes” and to “benefit the injured worker,” was clearly removed by Act 57.

One of the most ridiculous aspects of Act 57 was the creation of the Impairment Rating Evaluation (IRE). As we have previously noted, once an injured worker has received 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the workers’ compensation insurance carrier can request an IRE. As the Act itself states, in Section 306(a.2)(1), the IRE is used “to determine the degree of impairment due to the compensable injury, if any.” If this permanent impairment rating is less than 50% (a preposterously high standard), the status of the injured worker may be changed to “partial” disability status.

Now, logically, one can only have a permanent impairment rating if the impairment is, well, “permanent.” Our handy dictionary tells us that “permanent” means “lasting or intended to last or remain unchanged indefinitely.” Therefore, again applying logic, if an injured worker has a “permanent” impairment, he or she cannot, at the very same time, be “fully recovered.”

When an employee in Pennsylvania is injured on the job, and disabled from work as a result of the injury, workers’ compensation benefits should start. These benefits usually stop either when the injured worker is fully recovered or goes back to work (they can be stopped for other reasons, such as incarceration or refusal to undergo reasonable and necessary medical treatment, but that’s for another blog entry).

An injured worker who goes back to work has a period during which he or she may file to reinstate workers’ comp total disability benefits, if the disability recurs. The Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act was a bit unclear on whether this period was three years from the date of the most recent payment of compensation, or 500 weeks from the date of the reduction or stoppage of benefits. Recently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania clarified this answer for us all, in the decision of Cozzone v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (East Goshen Township).

In this case, Mr. Cozzone, the injured worker (claimant), suffered a serious injury to his back in 1989. Despite the severity of his injury, claimant went back to work in 1989 and his benefits were stopped. Claimant then continued to work, with no loss of wages, for over 13 years. In 2003, claimant and the workers’ comp insurance carrier entered into a Supplemental Agreement, reinstating total disability benefits (Additional Supplemental Agreements were also entered into between the parties, reinstating benefits again, in 2005 and 2007).

Sadly, we see many catastrophic injuries which occur on the job. While all such tragic situations are devastating to the family of an injured worker, the most devastating must be the cases where the worker is actually killed by the work injury. Though justice is important in every case, somehow it just seems that much more important when the injured worker is not here to fight for him or herself.

When a worker has a fatal injury, the key question is whether the incident at work was a “substantial contributing factor” in causing the death. Sometimes, the issue gets a bit confusing when some other medical condition, having nothing to do with work, also plays some role in the situation. Recently, in Manitowoc Co., Inc. and Sentry Insurance v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Cowan), the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania was confronted with such a case.

Here, the worker was killed when he fell about six feet from a crane platform. A witness described that the worker was on the platform and, while crouching, his eyes rolled back, and he fell off the platform striking his head on the floor. The worker initially had a pulse, but then stopped breathing. He was then resuscitated and transported to the hospital, where he passed away. An autopsy concluded that the cause of death was “cardiac dysrhythmia due to mitral valve prolapse.”

Previously, we have discussed when the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has addressed whether an employee was in the “scope and course” of his or her job at the time of the work injury. This issue has once again risen on appeal.

In the case of Trigon Holdings, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Griffith), the injured worker was a supervisor in a machine shop. After he made sure his guys were set up, and the machines were all running properly, he told them he would be in another room for a few minutes. Five minutes later, his left thumb was caught in a machine while he was polishing a part for his child’s go-cart, severely injuring the thumb. As a result of the thumb injury, the injured worker was disabled from his job.

A Claim Petition was filed and litigated before a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ). The injured worker, and witnesses he offered, testified that employees at the machine shop were permitted to work on personal things at the shop, and this was something done on a frequent basis. The general manager of the company testified that this action was never permitted and was totally unacceptable. In granting the Claim Petition, the WCJ found the testimony of the injured worker, and his witnesses, more credible than of the general manager. Specifically, the WCJ found that “a small temporary departure from work does not break the course of employment[,] and that an incident necessary to constitute a break in the course of employment must be of a pronounced character.'” On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB).

While an injured worker in Pennsylvania generally cannot sue his or her employer for causing a work injury (since Pennsylvania workers’ compensation is an “exclusive remedy”), the injured worker is able to sue a third party for causing a work injury. We see this situation with car accidents, slip and fall cases and products liability cases.

When an injured worker in PA does sue another party for causing his or her work injury (called a “third party”), and is awarded money, the workers’ compensation insurance carrier is entitled to be repaid money that it paid in medical expenses and wage loss benefits (this is called “subrogation”). Ultimately, unless the attorney negotiates something better (which is what happens normally), the injured worker ends up with no money from this third party case.

Not every law suit involving a work injury creates a right to subrogation, however. For example, a PA workers’ compensation insurance carrier is not entitled to subrogation in a medical malpractice award, if the work injury was not aggravated by the malpractice. The key is whether the award in the third party case is a direct result of what caused the disability.

Say you are coming home from work and you are injured; are you entitled to workers’ compensation benefits in Pennsylvania? As we have mentioned previously, generally, an employee is not eligible for injuries suffered in the commute to or from work (known as the “Going and Coming Rule”). Recently, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania addressed this issue again in Mansfield Brothers Painting and Selective Insurance Company of America v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB).

A union painter was assigned to work full-time for his employer at the University of Pennsylvania. While on his way home from the job one day, the painter fell near the train station, and hurt his left shoulder, neck and back. A Claim Petition was filed and litigated before a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ).

The facts were not in dispute. The painter was hired to work at a specific building on the Penn campus, which only had a single entrance. He elected to commute to work by train. On the walk to the train station, about 150 feet from the exit of the building in which he worked, the painter fell on an uneven slate walkway and suffered these injuries. The fall took place while the painter was still on Penn’s campus.

Once an injured worker in Pennsylvania has an accepted work injury (whether by decision of a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ), or the issuance of a Notice of Compensation Payable or Agreement for Compensation), such benefits can only be suspended for a limited number of reasons. A return to gainful employment, with no loss of wages, is obviously the most desirable reason. Other reasons can include incarceration after a conviction and proof of available employment at the pre-injury wages.

An additional reason, though rarely seen, is an intervening injury, not related to work, which renders the injured worker totally disabled. The case that first established this principle was Schneider, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB), decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2000. This case involved a unique set of facts, and it was hoped the principle would be limited to facts so extreme.

The injured worker in the Schneider case was receiving benefits for a work injury involving his head and neck. He was then involved in a serious non-work-related incident which left him with severe brain damage and paralysis. A Petition for Suspension was granted, stopping the workers’ compensation benefits, without any requirement that the workers’ compensation insurance carrier show any jobs were available within the restrictions of the work injury. The WCJ found the opinion of the insurance carrier’s medical expert credible, that the injured worker was capable of some type of work (from the standpoint of the work-related injuries), though totally (and permanently) disabled by the non-work-related incident. The Court reasoned that it would be an “exercise in futility” to require the insurance company to show job availability, since the injured worker was totally disabled by a non-work-related cause.